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RECONCEPTUALIZING ENTREPRENEURIAL EXIT: DIVERGENT EXIT 
ROUTES AND THEIR DRIVERS
Abstract:  We develop a conceptual model of entrepreneurial exit which includes exit 
through liquidation and firm sale for both firms in financial distress and firms performing 
well. This represents four distinct exit routes. In developing the model, we complement the 
prevailing theoretical framework of exit as a utility-maximizing problem among entrepreneurs 
with prospect theory and its recent applications in liquidation of investment decisions. We 
empirically test the model using two Swedish databases which follow 1,735 new ventures and 
their founders over eight years. We find that entrepreneurs exit from both firms in financial 
distress and firms performing well. In addition, commonly examined human capital factors 
(entrepreneurial experience, age, education) and failure-avoidance strategies (outside job, 
reinvestment) differ substantially across the four exit routes, explaining some of the 
discrepancies in earlier studies.  
Keywords: Entrepreneurial Exit, Prospect Theory, Human Capital
1. Executive Summary
Entrepreneurship research has paid considerable attention to reasons and methods people 
use for starting their ventures. Less attention has been paid to the methods people use for 
exiting their ventures or what factors contribute to their choice of exit route. Most existing 
models of entrepreneurial exit have conceptualized exit as a utility-maximizing choice and, as 
a  consequence  – implicitly  or  explicitly  –have equated exit  with  the  failure  of  firms  or 
individual  entrepreneurs. A  utility-maximization  lens  suggests  that  the  decision  to  exit  is 
either a sign of entrepreneurial failure or that the opportunity costs to entrepreneurship have 
risen substantially. However, an emerging body of research acknowledges that entrepreneurial 
exit may also be a successful outcome.    
In this paper we study the exit of individual entrepreneurs from the firm they helped to 
create.  We draw  on  prospect  theory  and  its  recent  application  in  behavioral  finance  that
suggests that exit decisions are contingent on whether an entrepreneurial project is framed as 
a gain or as a loss. This theory predicts that gain or loss framing will affect not only the 
probability of exit, but also the type of exit. We argue that exit may be the result of failure as 
well as success, and research should identify which specific route of exit is utilized rather than 2
assume that exit equates with either failure or success. We combine two existing theoretical 
models of entrepreneurial exit to define and investigate four exit routes: exit by liquidation of 
high or low performing firms (harvest liquidation, distress liquidation) and exit by sale of high 
or low performing firms (harvest sale, distress sale). We empirically examine the relationship 
between entrepreneurs’ human capital and failure avoidance strategies for each exit route. The 
value of this approach is that we are able to show why discrepancies in earlier findings related 
to entrepreneurial experience, entrepreneurial aging, and failure-avoidance strategies are due 
to an under-conceptualization of the exit decision. Further, such discrepancies may be due to 
overly relying on models based on expected utility theories, suggesting that complementary 
perspectives on entrepreneurial exit are needed.
The research setting for this study is the complete population of firms started in 1995 by 
entrepreneurs  in  the  Swedish knowledge-intensive  sectors  (N=1,735).  We  use  two 
longitudinal databases maintained by Statistics Sweden: RAMS, which provides yearly data 
on all firms, and LOUISE, which provides yearly data on all Swedish inhabitants. 
The  results  provide  strong  support  for  our  conceptualization  of  exit  routes  and  also 
suggest  that  entrepreneurs’  human  capital  (experience,  education,  and  age)  and  failure-
avoidance strategies (taking an outside job, reinvestment) differentially impact these routes.  
Entrepreneurial experience increases the likelihood of exiting by harvest sale, but does not 
affect the likelihood of any other route nor continuation. An entrepreneur’s age increases the 
likelihood of harvest and distress sale compared to both types of liquidation or continuation.
Entrepreneurs with higher education are more likely to exit via distress liquidation rather than 
continuation.  Taking  an outside  job  decreases  the  probability  of  exiting  through  distress 
liquidation or distress sale, but does not affect the other exit routes. Finally, reinvestment into 
the firm decreases the probability of exit, regardless of exit route taken.3
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, viewing entrepreneurial 
exit jointly as a career choice and a liquidation of an investment, we draw upon prospect 
theory as applied to investment liquidation to develop and empirically validate a coherent 
theoretical framework of four exit routes corresponding to different levels of performance. 
Second,  we empirically  examine  the  factors  that  affect  the  choice  of  exit  route.  We 
combine human capital theory and prospect theory to construct more nuanced predictions of 
how entrepreneurs’ human capital and failure-avoidance strategies impact these exit routes, 
explaining some of the discrepancies in the earlier empirical literature.
For  entrepreneurs,  our  findings  provide  evidence  that  the  high  firm  failure  rates 
reported  in  both  the  academic  and  popular  press  may  be,  at  least  partially,  based  on  a 
misinterpretation  of entrepreneurs’ positive  exit  decisions  as failures.  The  findings  also 
indicate the importance of knowing the types of exit available and the decision processes 
associated with them.  For educators, this research validates the importance of considering 
potential exit routes and what skills are linked with each route so that entrepreneurs can more 
productively harvest the value from their firms.
2. Introduction
Entrepreneurship  scholars  have  established  that  people  enter  entrepreneurship  and 
operate their firms for a wide variety of reasons, including a desire to exploit a perceived 
opportunity, seeking autonomy or self-realization, or a lack of alternative employment (Carter 
et  al.,  2003;  Shane  and  Venkataraman, 2000;  Taylor,  1999).  It is  similarly reasonable  to 
assume  that  there  are several  reasons  for  people  to  leave  entrepreneurship (Storey et  al., 
2005), suggesting that exit is a multidimensional phenomenon. Yet, little attention has been 
paid to the different methods people use for exiting their ventures or what factors contribute to 
their choice of exit route, even though entrepreneurial exit has a significant effect on the 
entrepreneur,  the  firm,  competitive  market  dynamics  and  economies  through  wealth 4
redistribution (DeTienne, 2008). In addition, a large portion of previous work assumes that 
exit is a sign of failure (Brüderl et al., 1992), and that continuation is a measure of success 
(Brüderl et al., 1992; Pennings et al., 1998). Yet we know that many ongoing businesses are 
not necessarily successful in terms of operating at a profit (van Witteloostuijn, 1998), and that 
many entrepreneurial exits are in fact not perceived as failures (Bates, 2005; McGrath, 2006).
In this  research  we  ask  two  questions:  how  do entrepreneurs’  route  of  exit relate to 
differential levels of performance, and what theoretical mechanisms contribute to their choice 
of exit route? Following Gimeno and colleagues (1997) we argue that a main reason for lack 
of systematic research progress is that exit has remained an underspecified variable. To date, 
the  literature has  not  sufficiently  made  the  distinction  between  different  exit  routes.  For 
example, Storey et al. (2005) suggest that firms might be sold for a variety of reasons, but no 
study has distinguished between the sale of more or less successful businesses. Either all types 
of sales have been viewed jointly (Mitchell, 1994) or they have been separated based on the 
characteristics  of  the  buyer  (Birley  and  Westhead,  1993)  or  the  future  career  of  the 
entrepreneur (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994). Gimeno et al. (1997) showed that factors predicting 
firm liquidation differ from factors predicting firm sale, but their focus was on liquidated vs. 
continued firms. Sold firms were excluded from their analysis.
The first contribution of this paper is to conceptually and empirically distinguish among 
different exit routes. Our basic argument is that research needs to identify the specific exit 
route used, rather than assuming that exit equates with either failure or success. Equating 
entrepreneurial exit with either failure or success gives a single-eyed and biased view of the 
phenomenon. Once this assumption is relaxed, we need a framework for understanding how 
exit relates to differential levels of failure and success. Viewing entrepreneurial exit jointly as 
a career choice and a liquidation of an investment, we draw upon prospect theory as applied to 5
investment liquidation to develop and empirically validate a coherent theoretical framework 
of four exit routes corresponding to different levels of performance. 
The second contribution of this paper is to empirically examining the factors that affect
the choice of exit route. We combine human capital theory and prospect theory to construct 
more  nuanced  predictions  of  how  entrepreneurs’ human  capital  and  failure-avoidance
strategies impact these exit routes, explaining discrepancies in the earlier empirical literature.
This paper starts with a theoretical examination of exit from the perspectives of expected 
utility and prospect theory. In doing so, we discuss specific exit routes that take jointly into 
consideration firm performance and exit. Next, we develop and test hypotheses as to how 
human capital and failure-avoidance strategies affect these exit routes. Finally, we discuss our
results and the implications for research and practice, and draw conclusions.
3. Theoretical Development
In entrepreneurship research there has been some confusion whether research on exit 
deals with the exit of the entrepreneur or the exit of the firm they operate (Davidsson and 
Wiklund,  2001).  Often  firms  and  entrepreneurs  exit  simultaneously,  for  example,  when 
entrepreneurs  liquidate their  firms.  But  entrepreneurs  can  also  exit  a  firm  that  continues
operations, such as when an entrepreneur sells the firm to another owner who continues the 
business. In this study we examine situations in which the individual exits the firm, and what
exit route is taken. We do not consider what individuals do subsequent to exiting their firms. 
3.1 Expected Utility and Prospect Theories on Entrepreneurial Exit
An entrepreneur’s exit can be viewed both as a career choice and as liquidation of a 
financial  investment.  These  perspectives  are  linked  to  two  partly  competing  theoretical 
perspectives. The expected utility framework views career choices such as choosing between 
employment and self-employment as an individual’s attempt to maximize returns on her/his6
human capital (Becker, 1964).This framework dominates research on entrepreneurial career 
choice, including entrepreneurial exit (e.g. Douglas and Shepherd, 2000; van Praag, 2003). 
Conversely,  behavioral  finance  research  on investment  liquidation  does  not always 
assume utility-maximization (e.g., Kyle et al., 2006).  Based on Kahneman  and Tversky’s 
(1979) prospect  theory,  this  research argues that  financial  gains  or losses  are  examined 
relative to a reference point (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). We find the notion of reference 
points valuable for theoretical examinations of entrepreneurial exit decision since it explicitly 
states that the utility loss for realizing a loss of a certain size is greater than the utility gain 
from  realizing  a  gain  of  the  same  size, and that  the  marginal  utility  of  gains  (losses) 
diminishes with the size of the gain (loss). This explains why the entrepreneurial exit decision 
might be differentially related to financial performance. For example, entrepreneurs with low 
performing firms might try to sell these to recoup some of the losses rather than liquidate the 
firm  (van  Witteloostuijn,  1998).  The  only  study  to  date  that  incorporates the  notion  of 
reference points in the entrepreneurship literature is Gimeno et al. (1997), who investigated 
how entrepreneurs’ human capital has both direct and indirect effects on firm liquidation. 
3.2 Exit Routes
Prior research on exit has shown that firm sale is distinct from firm liquidation (Gimeno 
et al., 1997: Mitchell, 1994), but there is little theoretical guidance suggesting what types of 
liquidations or sales entrepreneurs consider, and why (Storey et al., 2005). In this paper we 
differentiate  between  liquidation  and  sale, on  the  one  hand, and  between  high  and  low 
performance, on  the  other hand,  to  arrive  at  four  different  types  of  exits.  To  distinguish 
between exit from firms that are performing well or poorly, we rely on prospect theory’s 
reference  point logic,  which  in  our  case  corresponds  to  continuation  of  the  firm. In  the 
language of prospect theory, a high-performance exit is equivalent to exit in a gain situation 7
performing above the reference point, and a low-performance exit is equivalent to exit in a 
loss situation performing below the reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Kyle et al. (2006) develop a model that considers the conditions under which investors 
liquidate investments in gain and loss situations, considering exogenous events that may force 
the investor to liquidate. This is a highly relevant addition in the context of entrepreneurial 
exit because events outside of the control of the entrepreneur (forced bankruptcy, closure of 
major client) may influence her possibilities to continue. Consistent with prospect theory and 
observations of investments (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), their model suggests that in gain 
situations  investors  rapidly  convert  investments  into  cash,  but  delay  liquidations  in  loss 
situations. Taking potential exogenous events into account, the following outcomes are most 
likely:  (i)  if  a  project  is  successful,  this  will  accelerate  liquidation;  (ii)  if  a  project  is 
unsuccessful,  liquidation  will  be  delayed;  and  (iii)  because  unsuccessful  projects  lead  to 
delayed  liquidations,  exogenously forced  liquidation  events  are  more  likely  to  affect 
unsuccessful than successful projects.
Van Witteloostuijn (1998) makes some valuable additions to this model by discussing 
firms in distress. He notes the difference between liquidating and selling a business as two 
distinct forms of exit. Second, he suggests that firms performing under a reference point may 
engage in failure-avoidance strategies to avoid liquidation. Third, he notes that flight from 
losses – the sale of an unprofitable firm to recoup some of the investments – is different from 
the worst case where the firm must be liquidated or put into bankruptcy at greater loss.
Taken together, these two models suggest that: (i) exit (sale or liquidation) could occur in
both  gain  and  loss  situations;  (ii)  sales  and  liquidation  under  losses  both  reflect  poor 
performance, but they do likely reflect different performance levels with liquidation under 
loss being the lowest-performing category; (iii) because people delay cutting their losses, 
exogenous forced events (such as forced bankruptcy) are most closely associated with the low 8
performing liquidations, and can be placed under the same heading. Applying the combined
frameworks to  entrepreneurial  exits where  both  high  and  low  performance  is  considered 
suggests a model with four exit routes differentiating between liquidations and sales of firms 
that are performing well (above a reference point) or firms that are performing poorly (below 
a  well-defined reference  point).  We  denote  these four  outcomes  as (i)  Harvest  Sale of  a 
profitable  business,  (ii)  Distress  Sale of  a  firm under  financial  distress;  (iii)  Harvest
Liquidation of  a  profitable  business,  (iv)  Distress  Liquidation of  a  firm  under  financial 
distress, all in addition to the baseline reference point (0) Firm continuation. We show this 
simple  framework of  liquidations  or  sales  of  firms  that  are  performing  well  (above  the 
reference point) or poorly (below the reference point) in Figure 1 as a two-by-two matrix:
------------------------------------------------------
---- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ----
------------------------------------------------------
3.2.1 Harvest Sale
Harvest sale refers to a situation where the firm continues while the entrepreneur exits as 
majority owner. Harvest sale extracts some or all the economic value from the investment 
(Petty, 1997). While research has noted that entrepreneurs may have many unique motivations 
for new venture creation, individual wealth creation is often viewed as a defining objective for 
entrepreneurship (Certo et al., 2001). Yet, most of the wealth created by the entrepreneur 
remains embedded in the firm until the time of the harvest (DeTienne, 2008). Just as with an 
investor’s purchase of stock, the value remains unrealized until the business is sold (Petty, 
1997). Although a venture may create wealth during its lifetime, “a central part of the new 
venture value creation efforts hinges on the ability to harvest that value at some point(s) in the 
future” (Holmberg, 1991, p. 203). The sale of this equity allows the entrepreneur to realize 9
some portion of the firm’s wealth creation (Certo et al., 2001) while allowing the firm to 
continue. We therefore define the sale of a highly performing firm as a harvest sale. 
3.2.2 Distress Sale
Storey et al. (2005) suggest that there might be several distinct types of firm sales. Prior
research has identified sales with reference to the characteristics of the buyer (Birley and 
Westhead, 1993; DeTienne and Cardon, 2006). Implicit in this literature is that sale of a firm 
is equal to harvesting its value. However, firm sale may also be a preferred alternative to 
avoid bankruptcy or liquidation of a poorly performing firm. If a firm is starting to generate 
losses and the entrepreneur is unable to turn the situation around, he or she has the option to 
sell the business before it accumulates further losses, what Van Witteloostuijn (1998) refers to 
as “flight from loss”. We define distress sale as the sale of a firm under financial distress.  
3.2.3 Harvest Liquidation
Liquidation refers to the termination of the firm and the distribution of the value of its 
assets to the owner(s) and creditors. If this occurs in profitable firms, we refer to this as 
harvest liquidation.  Many reasons may exist for why entrepreneurs would choose harvest 
liquidation, including (but not limited to) divorce, desired career change, and retirement. One 
might question why entrepreneurs would liquidate a profitable firm when sale may provide a 
better financial return. Valid reasons might include a desire for expediency, aging or obsolete 
technology, inability to recognize a strategic buyer, or a capital-intensive firm with most of 
the value residing in marketable assets. Thus, liquidation may also occur in profitable firms.
3.2.4 Distress Liquidation
Finally, a firm in distress may be liquidated. In this study we do not discriminate between 
liquidations and bankruptcies, but instead discriminate between high-performing (profitable)
and low-performing (near-bankruptcy, i.e. in distress) liquidations. Whether to liquidate or put 
a  failing  firm  in  bankruptcy  is  largely a  choice  of the  entrepreneur.  Since bankruptcy  is 
associated with outright failure, which may have a stigma attached to it (Pretorius and Le 
Roux, 2007), entrepreneurs often choose to supply the firm with equity to avoid bankruptcy 10
and instead liquidate it, sell the assets, and pay off creditors (Thorburn, 2000). In an earlier 
study of bankruptcies, in 90% of the cases the firm, rather than creditors, filed the application 
(Thorburn, 2000), and a majority of firms re-appear after the bankruptcy settlement freed 
from debts, often under the same CEO (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2003). This suggests a high 
degree of volition in bankruptcy, implying that the theoretical performance distinction should 
be drawn between firms in distress vs. other firms. To validate the suggested model, we now 
turn to theorizing about how human capital and failure-avoidance strategies will impact these
exit routes. 
3.3. Entrepreneurial Exit, Human Capital, and Failure-Avoidance Strategies
The conceptual model developed is only meaningful if it holds up in empirical testing and 
if the different exit  routes (and the alternative of firm continuation) can  be explained  by 
relevant theory. We therefore turn to human capital theory to develop a set of hypotheses 
related to exit routes. Human capital theory has been the main theoretical underpinning of 
previous  exit  research, and  therefore  provides  a  relevant  framework  for  hypothesis 
development. Human capital theory uses economic logic to study individual career choices, 
such  as  choosing  between  employment  and  self-employment  (Becker,  1964).  It  follows 
economic logic by viewing individuals’ choice of occupation or employment as a choice that 
maximizes their long-term utility. Human capital theory also distinguishes between general 
and specific human capital. General human capital is made up of skills that are useful in a 
variety of work settings. Specific human capital is made up of skills that are more specialized 
and valuable in a particular context or organization, but less valuable in the general labor 
market.  In this study we look at three human capital variables that may be associated with a 
specific exit route: entrepreneurial experience, age, and education.
3.3.1. Entrepreneurial experience and exit
Although  most  applications  of  human  capital  theory  suggest  a  positive  relationship 
between  experience  and  entrepreneurial  continuation,  evidence  from  empirical  studies  is11
mixed.  In  a  study  of  1,361  U.K.  entrepreneurs,  Taylor  (1999)  found that  previous 
entrepreneurial experience decreased the probability of exit. Conversely, Jørgensen’s (2005) 
study of 31,000 Danish entrepreneurs revealed that prior experience increased the probability 
of  exit. In  other  studies,  the  relationship  between  prior  experience  and  exit  was  not
statistically significance (Brüderl et al., 1992; Gimeno et al, 1997; Van Praag, 2003). We 
believe that this mixed evidence is caused by a reliance on expected utility theory in most of 
these studies, and too narrow a definition of exit routes. For example, the studies by Gimeno 
et al. (1997) and Pennings et al. (1998) excluded firms that were sold and hence could not 
investigate the role of experience for entrepreneurs that sell their firms. The studies by Taylor 
(1999) and Van Praag (2003) distinguished between firms that exited due to bankruptcy and 
firms that were discontinued, but found no distinct difference between these groups in terms
of entrepreneurial experience.
So what makes experience important? Research on entrepreneurial learning suggests that 
the  skills  and  knowledge  relevant  to  successfully  managing  and  operating  a  business  are 
mainly experiential in nature (Politis, 2005; Starr and Bygrave, 1992). Although other aspects 
of human capital may have an impact on an individual’s entrepreneurial ability, the learning 
literature would  suggest  that  previous  entrepreneurial  experience  is  likely to  be  the  most 
important aspect of human capital in predicting entrepreneurial success.  This argument is 
supported  by  social  learning  theory  (Bandura,  1977), which  states  that  one  of  the  most 
powerful ways of learning is through enactive mastery (i.e. learning by doing). Specifically, 
the studies of habitual entrepreneurs have highlighted the importance of previous experience 
for the successful sale of an entrepreneurial venture (e.g. Ucbasaran et al., 2003), suggesting 
that the experience of operating a previous business assists in the management of subsequent 
ones. Repeat entrepreneurs are likely to have larger amounts of personal financing and greater 
access to external sources of financing (Wright and Westhead, 1998), and they tend to create 12
firms with higher growth potential (Colombo and Grilli, 2005). Venture capitalists view also 
entrepreneurial  experience  favorably  for  investment  decisions  because  it  reflects  greater 
ability to build a high-potential venture and to be capable of successful exit (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984). Hence, previous entrepreneurial experience also signals a willingness to let go 
of previous businesses. Thus we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurial experience has a positive effect on the probability of making a 
harvest sale relative to continuation, liquidation, distress liquidation and distress sale.
3.3.2. Age of the Entrepreneur and Exit
Several utility theory arguments such as human capital productivity (Harada, 2004) and 
life-time risk preferences (Morin and Suarez, 1983) suggest that older entrepreneurs should be 
more likely to exit. Empirical evidence is however mixed with some studies indicating that 
older entrepreneurs are more likely to exit (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994: Taylor, 1999; Bates, 
1990), and other studies showing they are less likely to exit (Gimeno et al., 1997; Van Praag, 
2003).  Similarly  to  entrepreneurial  experience,  we  believe  that  these  discrepancies  in  the 
literature are intimately related to the underspecification of exit routes, and the predominant 
role of expected utility theory in prior theorizing about the role of aging.
To modify the predictions of expected utility theory we draw upon prospect theory and 
Becker’s  (1965)  economic  theory  of  time  allocation.  The  latter  theory suggests that the 
opportunity cost of time increases with age because a smaller period of life remains. This 
influences the subjective value of the discounted future cash flow of a profitable business 
relative to selling the business so that, all else equal, older entrepreneurs place a lower value 
on the discounted future cash flow (Lévesque and Minniti, 2006). Behavioral finance studies 
of  entrepreneurial  exit  relying  on  prospect  theory make  similar predictions  by depicting
entrepreneurs as ‘hyperbolic discounters’ rather than ‘utility-maximizers’ – i.e. they prefer ‘$1 
today rather than $2 tomorrow’ (Grenadier and Wang, 2007). Both theoretical frameworks 
suggest that an older entrepreneur should place a higher value on a bid for her firm. All other 13
things  equal,  the  chance  of  a  harvest  sale  would  increase  with  age,  compared  to  firm 
continuation. Conversely, if the firm is performing poorly and substantial effort is needed to 
turn the firm around, older entrepreneurs would be more likely to sell the business (distress 
sale) rather than continue operations because they would be more concerned about immediate 
financial  gains and  losses.  Risk  aversion  might attract  them  to  the  certain  outcome  of  a 
distress sale rather than the uncertain outcome of continued operations (van Witteloostuijn, 
1998). If an entrepreneur chooses to continue operating a poorly performing firm, the eventual 
outcome may well be liquidation, suggesting that the probability of both continuation and 
liquidation decrease with age. Since some aspects of human capital may increase with age 
(such as accumulated life experience) but others may decrease (such as stamina), there is no 
clear  indication  that  age  should  be  positively  or  negatively  associated  with  performance. 
Hence, we do not expect age to be associated with one particular type of sale over the other.
These arguments suggest that older entrepreneurs should be more likely to prefer the sale 
(harvest as well as distress) of the business over continued operations and liquidation: 
Hypothesis 2: Age has a positive effect on the probability of making a (a) harvest sale, or (b)
distress sale relative to continuation, harvest liquidation, or distress liquidation.
3.3.3. Education and exit 
Previous research has shown that education has a positive effect on firm performance 
(Cooper et al., 1994). Individuals with higher levels of education usually have greater access 
to resources such as financial and social capital (Davidsson and Honig, 2003), and therefore 
are more likely to be able to mobilize those resources to enhance the performance of the firm. 
Some studies indicate that higher education decreases the probability of exit (Bates, 1990; 
Brüderl  et  al.,  1992).  Other  studies  show  that  education  increases the  probability  of  exit 
(Taylor, 1999) or reveal insignificant results (Arum and Muller, 2004). A likely reason for 
this conflicting evidence is that while education is associated with access to financial and 
social  capital,  education  also  increases the  options  open  to  the  entrepreneur  to  sell  their 14
business regardless of its current performance. Gimeno and colleagues (1997) argued that 
those with greater education have more job options available to them outside of their current 
venture, or after they exit their current venture. Because of this, they have higher opportunity 
costs associated with sticking to an underperforming firm. Highly educated entrepreneurs may 
therefore be more likely to demonstrate a “flight from losses” (Van Witteloostuijn, 1998) and 
sell the firm at the first sign of low performance to their high standards.
The positive effect of education on performance coupled with the higher opportunity cost 
suggests that while educated people are less likely to manage their business under a given 
level of performance, they also require higher performance for remaining in entrepreneurship. 
Thus education should have a positive effect on the ability of the entrepreneur to build a 
business that is harvestable as well as increase the preference for harvesting the business.  
Hypothesis 3: Education has a positive effect on the probability of making a harvest sale 
relative to continuation. 
3.3.4. Taking an outside job and exit
The  hypotheses  developed  above  refer  to  how  the  ability and  preferences of 
entrepreneurs influence their choice of exit route. Consistent with the suggestions of Van 
Witteloostuijn (1998) we also explicitly examine the use of failure-avoidance strategies and 
their relationship with the different exit routes identified. As most exits occur when firms are 
small, we look at failure-avoidance strategies relevant to entrepreneurs in these kinds of firms.
Failure results from the inability of the firm to generate sufficient revenues to cover its 
costs,  eventually  leading  to  depletion  of  the  firm’s  working  capital  (Shepherd,  2003).  If 
attempting to avoid liquidation, changes in the business aimed at reducing the costs of the 
firm  are  more  immediate  than  attempts  to  increase  revenues.  A  common  strategy  of 
entrepreneurs in this situation is to diversify their personal streams of income (Rosa, 1998). 
This  reduces  the  costs  of  the  business  and  simultaneously  makes the  entrepreneur  less 
dependent upon his or her firm. Studies have found that income diversification by taking up a 15
paid job is common: According to the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), as 
much as 80  percent of  nascent entrepreneurs  concurrently hold  some type  of outside  job 
(Gartner, et al., 2004). Carter et al. (2006) found that a major motivator for taking an outside 
job  among  U.K.  entrepreneurs was  to  keep  down  costs  of  the  business,  thus  avoiding 
liquidation. Similarly, Gimeno et al. (1997) found that those with an outside job withdrew less 
income from their firm  and were willing to  continue  operations with  lower performance, 
supporting  the  role  of  income  diversification  as  a  means  of  avoiding  liquidation.  These 
findings are fully consistent with van Witteloosuijn’s (1998) model suggesting cost reduction
as  one  of  the  major  strategies  for  avoiding  failure.  Conversely,  there  is little  reason  for 
entrepreneurs with a high-performing firm to divert time away from that firm by taking on 
outside employment. Thus, taking an outside job should buffer against the probability of low 
performance exits but be unrelated to high-performance exit:
Hypothesis 4: Taking an outside job has a negative effect on the probability of (a) distress 
liquidation and (b) distress sale, relative to continuation, harvest liquidation and harvest sale.
3.3.5. Additional equity investment and exit
An alternative strategy for an entrepreneur attempting to save a firm that is potentially 
facing failure is through additional infusions of cash, i.e., increasing shareholders’ equity. 
Although we know that initial capital – both debt and equity – lowers the probability of exit 
(Bates, 1990: Delmar et al., 2006), the consequences of increases in equity have been little 
explored in the literature. For low performing firms we expect that increases in equity should 
buffer  against  the  probability  of  exit.  For  high  performing  firms  financial  pecking  order 
theory suggests that retained earnings should be the preferred source of financing (Carpenter 
and Petersen, 2002). Countries with high tax regimes, such as Sweden, further dissuade equity 
investments of private capital into closely held firms relative to reinvesting retained earnings. 
Payouts  of  salaries  or  dividends  to  owners  are  taxed  multiple  times  before  they  can  be 
reinvested  into  the  firms,  whereas  retained  earnings  remain  untaxed.  These are  strong 16
incentives not to make additional equity investments into high performance firms, should the 
entrepreneur consider harvest sale. We therefore expect a negative association between equity 
investments and a harvest sale. In sum, albeit driven by different mechanisms, we expect that 
additional investments are associated with lower probabilities of all types of exits: 
Hypothesis 5: Additional equity investments have a negative effect on the probability of (a) 
firm sale (distress or harvest) and (b) liquidation (distress or harvest) relative to continuation.  
4. Methods
4.1. Sample and data sources
A problem in the entrepreneurship literature is that new firms and their founders are 
extremely heterogeneous, ranging from mom and pop retail stores to venture-capital backed 
start-ups  (Davidsson,  2007).  In  order  to  provide  robust  models  with  some  claims  for 
generalizability, empirical studies need to control for this heterogeneity (Davidsson, 2007; 
Wennberg, 2005). To decrease unobserved heterogeneity on the individual level we excluded 
spin-offs from existing businesses and sampled only ‘de novo’ firms owned by a single firm 
founder. We also excluded sole proprietorships because this is not an entity separate from its 
owner in legal terms and in Sweden proprietorships cannot be transferred to a new owner 
through a  sale, which  limits  the  potential exit  routes. Excluding  proprietorships  was  also 
motivated by the need to exclude part-time and miniscule firms for which exit may be “a 
trivial decision” (Gimeno et al., 1997, p. 760).
To decrease unobserved heterogeneity on the industry level, where survival rates, barriers 
to entry and exit, access to opportunities (Shane, 2003) and business models (Carter et al., 
1997) are different, we only sampled firms in the knowledge-intensive sectors. The selection 
of knowledge-intensive sectors follows Eurostat and OECD's classification, which is based on 
the R&D intensity being higher than the mean of the overall economy (Götzfried, 2004). 
These industries comprise about 60% of all firms started in Sweden (ITPS, 2006), and include 17
most ‘rapidly growing’ industries (chemicals/medicine, telecom, finance, business services, 
information technology, education and research) except for agriculture and retail.
The data source in this project is a combination of two longitudinal databases maintained 
by Statistics Sweden: RAMS, which provides yearly data on all firms registered in Sweden, 
and LOUISE, which provides yearly data on all Swedish inhabitants. We used RAMS to 
sample all Swedish privately owned firms started as incorporations or partnerships during 
1995.  We  chose  1995  since  this  was  a  year  when  start-up  rates  were  at  their  decennial 
average, and the economy was neither in recession nor booming. 
To ensure that individual entrepreneurs have discretion over the firm’s future, 14 firms 
where no individual with a majority stake could be identified (less than 1% of the sample) 
were excluded.
1 The result is a sample of 1735 firms, amounting to approximately 40% of all 
independent start-ups in these sectors. We linked longitudinal data on the firms and their 
development  until  2002  to  data  on  their  founders  from  LOUISE.  Individual-level  data 
includes founders’ career histories, education, family and other sociodemographic variables. 
Firm level data includes full balance sheets as well as exit codes that in combination with the 
individual data allow us to differentiate between the distinct exit routes.
4.2. Dependent variables
Our  dependent  exit  variable can  take  on  five  values  each  year:  (0)  continuation,  (1) 
harvest sale, (2) distress sale, (3) harvest liquidation, and (4) distress liquidation. We used 
year to  year transitions  of firms and individuals in order to classify continuation  and the 
different exit events. To distinguish firms in financial distress from more well performing 
firms we used Altman’s Z-score model of financial distress (Miller and Reuer, 1996). The Z-
score model builds on variables reflecting a firm’s financial health to separate low from high 
performing firms using indicators of size, leverage, liquidity and performance as predictors of 
                                                
1 Exclusion of these ‘team start-ups’ was theoretically motivated by our human capital framework which focuses 
on individuals’ career choices, and methodologically necessary since we cannot compare the human capital of an 
individual entrepreneur with that of a two- or three-member team of entrepreneurs in any logical way.18
‘financial distress’, based on Altman’s (1968) optimization of the model’s predictive abilities. 
Following Altman and subsequent literature, we used the following variables and notations:
Z-Score = A*3.3 + B*0.99 + C*0.6 + D*1.2 + E*1.4
A = Earnings Before Interest & Taxes/ Total Asset (measures productivity of firm assets), 
B = Net Sales/ Total Asset (sales generating ability of firm assets), C = Book Value of Equity/ 
Total  Liabilities (measures  potential  for  insolvency),  D  =  Working  Capital/  Total  Assets
(measures net liquid assets relative to total capitalization), and E = Retained Earnings/ Total 
Assets (measures amount of reinvested earnings and/or losses in the firm
2).The convention for 
interpreting the Z-Score in the literature and in practice is: ‘safe’ for Z Scores above 3.0, 
‘alertness’ for  Z-Scores between 2.7 and 2.99,  ‘good chances of the company going into 
distress’ for Z-Scores between 1.8 and 2.7, and ‘high probability of  financial embarrassment’ 
for Z-Scores below 1.8. Thus, values below 3.0 signal some level of financial distress. Out of 
245 (894) sold (liquidated) firms in our sample, 97 (460) had Z-Scores below 3.0, 91 (436)
had Z-Scores below 2.7, and 78 (410) had Z-Scores below 1.8. Following the terminology of 
Altman (1968) and subsequent research indicating Z-scores below 2.7 as “good chances of 
distress,” we report the results for a Z-score cutoff of 2.7.
If a firm exists for two consecutive years but the individual coded as majority owner the 
first year is not majority owner the next, this is considered as an exit by sale. To separate 
these into harvest sales and distress sales we used the bankruptcy prediction model described 
above, where Z-Scores below 2.7 were coded as distress sales and those above were coded as 
harvest sales. If a firm exists in the RAMS database in one year but not in the next, this is 
classified as an exit by liquidation. We again used the Z-Score model to classify liquidations 
                                                
2 Altman (2000) notes that the model was originally developed for publicly listed firms where equity was based 
on market rather than book value. He suggest the weights (A*3.107+ B* 0.998+C*0.420+D*0.717+ E*0.847) if 
using book value of equity. Using these weights slightly increased the number of firms classified ‘in distress’ but 
did not alter our model estimates. We therefore maintained the original weights commonly used in the literature.19
with a Z-Score below 2.7 as distress liquidation and those above as harvest liquidation. The 
RAMS database carries a high reliability since firms cannot disappear for reasons such as a 
change in address or legal status; however, a firm may disappear because it is merged with 
another  firm, which  is  denoted  as  ‘merger’  in  RAMS.  Depending  on  the  ownership  and 
management of the newly merged entity, mergers may represent continuation or exit. We do 
not consider merger as a case of exit if the same entrepreneur continues to hold a controlling 
stake, and the firm is his or her primary workplace. This occurred in 23 cases. In unreported 
models we excluded these cases from the analyses, with no qualitative differences in results.
Note that "harvest sales" and "distress sales" are inferred from actual performance data and 
are not perceptions of success. It is possible that a firm could have been sold with a profit 
even though the firm was in financial distress according to the Altman Z-score. As robustness 
checks we therefore used alternative cut-off points using the full range of values in the Z-
Score model from 1.8 to 3.0. Only 7.6% of sold firms and 5.6% of liquidated firms changed 
category depending on whether a Z-score below 1.8, 2.7., or 3.0 was used, suggesting that 
most  firms  being  sold  operate  at  levels  far  away  from  the  cut-offs  values  and  that  our 
distinction between firms in distress and well-performing firms is robust.
4.3. Independent variables
4.3.1. Entrepreneurial experience
We used data from LOUISE on individuals’ career histories to create a variable of prior 
entrepreneurial experience, denoting the number of years of experience between 1989 –1995. 
The variable was thus truncated above 6, although it is possible that individuals involved in 
entrepreneurship in 1989 were so also prior to this. Truncation of independent variables can 
be  problematic  since  there  is  a  risk  of  underestimating  the  effect  of  the  variance  in  the 
variable at the positive end of the distribution (i.e. we cannot distinguish between 10 and 6 
years of experience), increasing the likelihood of type-2 errors. However, only 4.5% of the 
sample had six years of entrepreneurial experience, indicating low risk of systematic bias. In 20
addition  and more importantly, there  was strong empirical  support for  the effect of prior 
entrepreneurial experience in our model. Any bias caused by the truncation of this variable 
should therefore underestimate the effect of entrepreneurial experience, not overestimate it.
3
4.3.2. Age and education
All individuals living in Sweden receive a personal identification number based on their date 
of birth. This information was used to calculate age (number of years) of the individual.  We 
measured level of education as the number of years in education. This is the most common 
operationalization of general human capital in the entrepreneurship literature and consistent 
with previous studies examining entrepreneurial exit (Arum and Muller, 2004; Brüderl et al., 
1992; Van Praag, 2003). The variable was operationalized from education codes in LOUISE 
describing the length and type of an individual’s highest education.
4.3.3. Taking an outside job
We used data on personal earnings in LOUISE to distinguish between earnings from 
entrepreneurship  (dividends  or  salary  drawn)  and  earnings  from  other  jobs.  With  this 
information we created a dummy variable coded 1 if a person took up an outside job during 
the time he was engaged in entrepreneurship during our study time period.
4.3.4. Reinvestment of capital
We measure reinvestment of new capital as the percentage increase or decrease in equity 
from one year to another. The sources of additional capital could be retained earnings or 
additional investments by the entrepreneur. In unreported models, similar to McCarthy et al. 
(1993), we included both additional equity and debts, which had an identical but stronger 
effect.  For  conservative  reasons,  we  include  only  the  equity  measure.  Since  we  do  not 
hypothesize  any  temporal  aspect  of  equity, and  because  it  is  possible  that  additional 
investments  might  affect  exit  routes  both  immediately  and  in the  intermediate  term,  we 
                                                
3 To ensure robustness we also ran models with a dummy for persons with 6+ years of experience. This slightly 
decreased effects sizes but significance levels were still well below 5%. Further, we used an out-of-the sample 
cohort of entrepreneurs starting in 1998 where the entrepreneurial experience variable was truncated above 9 
instead of 6. Initiation of our model on this sample provided similar but stronger results for the entrepreneurial 
experience variable, indicating that results are robust to variable truncation (models available on request).21
collapsed all equity raised during the firm’s inception until its exit or until 2002. Because of 
high non-linearity, we used the logarithmic version of this variable in the regression models.
4.4. Control variables
We  included  a  number  of  controls  including  industry  experience,  gender,  parental 
entrepreneurship, county tenure, industry, legal form, and age and size of business. To create 
a variable of industry experience, we used data from LOUISE on individuals’ career histories 
denoting the number of years of prior work experience in the same industry as the current 
venture (SIC-2 digit level) between 1989 and 1995. Hence, also this control variable was 
truncated. Since prior research indicates that female entrepreneurs have higher exit rates than 
male entrepreneurs (e.g. Arum and Muller, 2004), we included a dummy variable coded 0 for 
men and 1 for women. Growing up in a family firm environment might affect the propensity 
to  engage  in  entrepreneurship  (Arum  and  Muller,  2004;  Gimeno  et  al.  1997,  Hence,  we 
included a dummy variable for family firm background. The variable is from LOUISE and 
Statistics Sweden’s cross-generation database (‘flergenerationsregistret’), which provides data 
on the labor market activities of all Swedish residents living in the same household from 1960 
to 2002. We also used data on the parents’ last place of work to control for the chance that 
entrepreneurs were taking over firms directly from parents, and used the cross-generation 
database to determine if the firms were sold to children or spouses, but found no such cases. 
To proxy for a person’s social network, we follow Dahl and Sorenson (2008) by including a 
variable counting the number of years that she has lived in the same county. Similar to the 
experience variables, county tenure was ordinal scaled from 0 to 6, truncated above this level. 
We controlled for the industry of a firm with eight dummy variables for each two-digit SIC 
code. The most common category was business services, followed by software, real estate, 
health care, media, financial services, high-tech manufacturing and research and development. 
To control for legal form a dummy variable coded one if a firm is incorporated was included.22
To control for duration dependence in entrepreneurs’ exit rates (e.g. Brüderl et al., 1992) we 
include dummies for each year in business. As a firm started by a single owner-manager 
grows, we may expect the impact of the entrepreneur to diminish over time. We therefore 
included a variable for firm size, measured as number of employees in the year before exit. In 
unreported models, we excluded the largest 5% of firms, with no difference in results.
4.5. Statistical analyses
To validate the model and test hypotheses we follow earlier exit research using a discrete 
choice framework. These are ‘disaggregated’ models, assuming individual discretion over the 
decision at hand (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Given our focus on the exit decisions made 
by entrepreneurs, this is a suitable approach. We estimate a series of multinomial logit models 
to statistically distinguish between the different types of exit events, where continuation is the 
base category. This also allows us to analyze the relative impact of different human capital 
variables and failure-avoidance strategies on different types of exit. Since the data constitute a 
cross-sectional time-series, panel data estimation with competing outcomes was considered. 
However, such estimations are computationally difficult for discrete time series in yearly form 
since it violates the assumption of tied events in data – i.e. two competing events should not 
be  able  to  happen  simultaneously  (Yamaguchi,  1991,  p.16).  For  discrete  time  series, 
multinomial logit models with time indicators are preferable and statistically close to identical 
(Yamaguchi, 1991, p.170). We therefore relied on this model. The multinomial logit is a 
normal  probability  model  conditional  on  the  usual  assumptions  of  random  heterogeneity, 
inclusion  of  all  relevant  variables,  and  non-heteroscedasticity  of  the  error  term.  Because 
heterogeneity is a well-know property of most data sets on entrepreneurs (Davidsson, 2007; 
Shane,  2003),  and  there  may  be  omitted  variables  affecting  the  choice  probabilities  of 
entrepreneurs’ exit routes, we conservatively used the robust estimation procedure allowing 
us to obtain consistent standard errors derived from the Huber/White estimator of variance.23
5. Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in table 1. Mean values for the five 
outcome variables (continuation, distress liquidation, harvest liquidation, distress sale, harvest 
sale) indicates that out of all entrepreneurs starting in 1995, 34% remained in business in 
2002, 26% exited by harvest liquidation and 25% by distress liquidation, 8% went through a 
harvest sale and 6% experienced a distress sale. The continuation rate of 34% is close to that 
reported earlier studies (Arum and Muller, 2004; Jørgensen, 2005; Gimeno et al., 1997). 
------------------------------------------------------
-- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ---
------------------------------------------------------
Analytically, we regard these exit routes as Weberian ideal types – that is, theoretical 
constructs  reflecting  some  common  aspects  of  a  social phenomenon.  Consistent  with  the 
original models by Kyle et al. and Van Witteloostuijn, this view is substantiated that there is a 
certain range of financial performance, time-risk preferences or failure-avoiding strategies 
associated with that exit route. We show in Figure 2 a concave prospect theory curve with the 
exit routes depicted. We also show the mean firms age in each exit route as well as their 
financial health according to the Z-Score model, as well as the percentage of entrepreneurs
applying one of the two-failure avoiding strategies investigated. ANOVA tests of the mean 
age, performance, and percentage of entrepreneur applying a failure avoiding strategy among 
the  4  groups  shows  statistical  significance  (p<0.05,  p<0.001  and  p<0.001,  respectively), 
indicating that consistent with Kyle et al. (2006), entrepreneurs in loss situations are more 
likely to delay exit, and, consistent with Van Witteloostuijn (1998), exit in distress is often 
preceded by a failure-avoiding strategy, suggesting face validity to our model of exit routes.
------------------------------------------------------24
-- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ---
------------------------------------------------------
As  a  major  intended  contribution  of  our  paper  is  the  development and  testing  of  a 
conceptual model of entrepreneurial exit, we started out by testing whether our quadripartite 
exit variable is empirically more or less valid and robust vis-á-vis alternative as follows: (i) 
Two outcomes, continuation and exit; (ii) Three outcomes: continuation, liquidation and sale; 
(iii) Four outcomes: continuation, liquidation, distress sale and harvest sale. The BIC value 
(the most general fit statistic) of our quadripartite model was -9468, superior to alternatives (i) 
and (ii) (-9004, -9386) but not superior to the tripartite definition (iii) with a BIC value -9782.
This raises some empirical concerns and we return to the issue in our discussion section. 
To determine the appropriateness of our model we computed a Wald test and found the
exit routes to be significantly different. To verify the assumptions of the multinomial model, 
we  used  the  Hausman  test  for  the  independence  of  irrelevant  alternatives  (IIA).  The  test 
statistics for the exit routes were: harvest liquidation= 24.23, distress liquidation = 21.56, 




provides support for the validity of our model, and suggests that prior work conceptualizing
exit as a binary outcome has pooled conceptually as well as mathematically distinct events.
------------------------------------------------------
-- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ---
------------------------------------------------------
Table 2 shows multinomial logit model predicting the four entrepreneurial exit routes,
where  continuation  is  the  base  category.  The  test  of  our  hypotheses  involves  not  only 
                                                
4 The alternative Small-Hsiao test provided identical results. The Hausman test statistic is displayed without time 
and industry dummies for ease of interpretation. A model with time and industry dummies revealed a negative 
Hausman statistic – also indicating the IIA assumption has not been violated (Long and Freese, 2006, p.244-45). 
Also the Cramer-Ridder test for pooling states in the multinomial logit model rejected the pooling hypothesis.25
differentiating between continuation and various exit routes, but also how different variables 
influence  what  exit  route  is  chosen.  A  robust  and  easy-to-interpret  way  to  verify  the 
differences  in  relationships  between  a  specific  variable  and  two  alternative  outcomes  in 
multinomial models is to estimate binary logit models for two different outcomes (Long and 
Freese, 2006), which forms the tests of our hypotheses. The results of such competing models 
are shown as a shaded row in Table 2 below each of the variables under examination.
Hypothesis  1  states  that  entrepreneurial  experience  should  have  a  positive  effect  on 
harvest sale relative to all other categories, summarized in Table 2 as “H1: 3>0,1,2,4”. Binary 
logit models reveal that entrepreneurial experience positively influences the probability of 
harvest  sale  vs.  continuation  (Marginal  Effect  (ME) = 1.61%,  p<0.01),  harvest  sale  vs. 
liquidation (ME = 1.73%, p<0.01), harvest sale vs. distress liquidation (ME = 16%, p<0.01),
and harvest sale vs. distress sale (ME = 3.65%, p<0.01), fully supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis  2  states  that  the  entrepreneur’s  age  should  have  a  positive  effect  on  the 
probability of making (a) a harvest sale or (b) distress, relative to all other categories. This is 
summarized in Table 2 as “H2a: 3>0,1,2” and “H2b: 4>0,1,2”. Binary models show that age 
positively influences the probability of harvest sale vs. continuation (ME = 1.93%, p<0.01), 
harvest sale vs. liquidation (ME = 1.70%, p<0.01), harvest sale vs. distress liquidation (ME = 
0.8%,  p<0.01), distress  sale  vs.  continuation  (ME  =  1.29%,  p<0.01), distress  sale  vs. 
liquidation (ME = 1.41%, p<0.01) and distress sale vs. distress liquidation (ME = 1.51%, 
p<0.01). This fully supports Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 states that education has a positive effect on the probability of making a 
harvest sale relative to continuation (“H3: 3>0” in Table 2). However, Table 2 shows that 
education  has  an  insignicantly  negative influence  on the  probability  of  harvest  sale  vs. 
continuation (ME = - 1.38%, p>0.10), rejecting this hypothesis.26
Hypothesis 4 states that taking an outside job has a negative effect on the probability of 
(a) distress liquidation and (b) distress sale, both relative to continuation, harvest liquidation 
and  harvest  sale. This  is  shown  in  Table  2  as  “H4a:  0,1,3>2”    and  “H4b:  0,1,3>4”, 
respectively.  Competing  logit  models  show that  taking  an outside  job during  venturing 
negatively influences the probability of distress liquidation vs. harvest liquidation (ME = -
9.88%, p<0.01), distress  liquidation  vs.  continuation (ME = -7.74%, p<0.01)  and distress 
liquidation  vs.  harvest  sale  (ME =  -10.44%,  p<0.01).  Further,  taking  an outside  job  (b) 
negatively influences the probability of distress sale vs. continuation (ME = -2.01%, p<0.01), 
distress sale vs. harvest liquidation (ME = -7.76%, p<0.01) and distress sale vs. harvest sale 
(ME = -3.84%, p<0.01). These results are fully supportive of Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 5 states that additional equity investments should have a negative effect on 
the probability of harvest sale, distress sale, harvest liquidation and distress liquidation, all 
relative to continuation (“H5: 0<1,2,3,4” in Table 5). The variable is entered in logarithmic 
form which makes marginal effects impossible to interpret. We instead compute how half a 
standard deviation of investment affects the different exit routes. Competing logit models 
reveal that additional equity negatively influences the probability of harvest liquidation vs. 
continuation (±0.5.S.d. = -11.78%, p<0.01), distress liquidation vs. continuation (±0.5.S.d. = -
21.08%, p<0.01), distress sale vs. continuation (±0.5 S.d. = 3.24%, p<0.01) and harvest sale 
vs. continuation (±0.5S.d. = 0.76%, p<0.05). This provides full support for Hypothesis 5. 
6. Discussion
In this paper, we viewed entrepreneurial exit jointly as a career choice and liquidation of 
a financial investment, combining human capital theory and prospect theory to develop a 
coherent  theoretical  framework  of  four  exit  routes  corresponding  to  different  levels  of 
performance. Any conceptualization of exit benefits from being derived from a parsimonious 
theoretical framework that  identifies theoretically distinct and empirically meaningful exit 27
categories. We believe that our model meets these goals and thus constitutes an important 
contribution  to  the  growing  literature  on  entrepreneurial  exit.  The  joint  consideration  of 
performance level and continuation or discontinuation of the firm constitutes a simple yet 
powerful framework that should be broadly applicable in future studies.
Our empirical validations showed that this model was empirically valid and superior to 
alternative specifications of exit consisting of one or two exit routes. It was, however, not 
superior  to  a  specification  of  three  exit  routes combining  harvest  liquidation  and  distress 
liquidation into one category. We believe that, at least in part, this result is driven by the 
empirical context in which the study took place. In Sweden, liquidation is a cumbersome 
process and harvest liquidation will lead to greater taxation for the entrepreneur than would a 
harvest sale. Thus, we think that the dimensions we have identified for our conceptual model, 
i.e.,  sale  vs.  liquidation  and  high  vs.  low  performance, represents  a  relevant  conceptual 
framework, but national legal systems may affect how well the framework fits empirically.
Statistical tests showed that our quadripartite model was valid and the human capital 
variables and failure-avoidance strategies that we identified predicted the choice of exit routes 
in meaningful ways consistent with theory. We  posited five hypotheses and received full 
support  for  four  of  them.  Importantly,  the  test  of  our  hypotheses  involved  the  choice  of 
specific exit routes relative to other exit routes and to continuation. In total, twenty of twenty-
one hypothesized effects were supported by data, speaking to the validity of our framework.
In  terms  of  specific  findings,  we  made  some  interesting  observations  as  to the 
relationships between human capital variables and exit routes that are consistent with theory 
and our conceptualization of four exit routes, but less so with other conceptualizations of exit. 
For entrepreneurial experience, it has been argued that entrepreneurs learn on the job and, 
therefore,  previous  experience  is  the  most  important  predictor  of  entrepreneurial  success 
(Davidsson and Honig, 2003); however, empirical studies have showed mixed evidence as to 28
whether experienced entrepreneurs were more or less likely to exit. Our finer-grained model 
indicates that entrepreneurial experience was positively associated with a harvest sale relative 
to continuation and all other exit routes. Each year of experience increases the probability of 
harvesting the business relative to harvest liquidation by 1.61%, increases the probability of 
harvesting relative to distress sale by 3.65%, and increases the probability of harvesting rather 
than  having  to  make  a distress liquidation  by  a  massive  16%.  The  two  last  figures  are
particularly interesting since they support the relevance of separating different types of sales. 
Sale can reflect the ability of the entrepreneur to build a successful business and willingness 
to harvest its value, but a sale can also be a last resort to avoid an unwanted outcome. The 
entrepreneurial experience variable also provides strong support for the conceptual model 
with four exit routes. The analysis with only two outcomes (continuation vs. exit) indicated
that entrepreneurial experience had a positive effect on exit. If interpreted from a framework 
where exit is equated with failure, it would indicate that experienced entrepreneurs perform 
worse. Our model provides a more nuanced view of the impact of entrepreneurial experience 
on exit, including both positive and negative types of exit. Had we only separated sales from 
liquidation, we  would  erroneously  have  drawn  the  conclusion  that  the  effects  of 
entrepreneurial experience and age on exit are similar when they are not. Our study suggests
that experience enhances entrepreneurs’ ability to build value and their willingness to harvest 
this value. This supports the logic of comparing serial to novice entrepreneurs (Westhead and
Wright, 1998), and for educators to stress the importance of learning-by-doing. For investors,
entrepreneurial experience seems to be much more important than other aspects of human 
capital in differentiating between those making harvest sales and those who do not. 
Also for age, our study can explain as to why previous studies relying on the economic 
utility of human capital have yielded inconsistent findings. Human capital theory suggests that 
with age comes general experience, which should lower the probability of exit. Conversely,29
we  found  that age  was  positively  associated  with sales (harvest or  distress)  compared  to 
continuation and both forms of liquidation. Our interpretation is that age does not necessarily 
influence the ability of an entrepreneur, but rather their willingness to exit. Each year of age 
increases the probability of a harvest sale relative to harvest liquidation by 1.7%, distress sale 
relative to harvest liquidation by 1.4%, harvest sale relative to distress liquidation by 0.8%, 
and distress sale relative to distress liquidation by 1.5%. These differences can explain why 
some studies found a positive effect of age on exit (Bates, 1990; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; 
Taylor, 1999), while others found a negative effect (Gimeno et al., 1997; Van Praag, 2003).
Where human capital theory posits that age is a proxy for experiences, this study shows that 
there  is  also  a  strong  behavioral  component  of  age  with  a  clear  affect on  entrepreneurs 
decision-making (Harrisson and Rutström, 2007). Our re-conceptualization of exit and the 
empirical results thus offers a reconciliation of conflicting findings by offering a more fine-
grained approach to exit and its relationship with the entrepreneur’s age.
The findings concerning education were surprising in that those with higher levels of 
education  were  less  likely  to  harvest  their  firms  relative  to  exit  by  distress  liquidation. 
Although  this  finding  is  in  conflict  with  our  hypothesis,  one  possible  explanation  is  the 
overconfidence that often comes with education (Clayson, 2005). Those with more education 
may assume that they have the knowledge and skills necessary to build a fledging business 
that is harvestable, but fail to meet expectations. This area is worthy of greater attention.
In support of van Witteloostuijn’s (1998) suggestions, we find that a failure-avoidance 
strategy focused on reducing costs appears appropriate. In this study, entrepreneurs reducing 
costs of the business by taking an outside job lowered the probability of low performance 
exits  distress  sale  and  distress  liquidation.  Previous  empirical  work  has  shown  that 
entrepreneurs are motivated to seek outside employment to avoid liquidation (Carter et al. 
2006). Our findings show that such ambitions materialize.30
An alternative failure-avoidance strategy is to invest additional equity. We found that 
such reinvestments reduced the probability  of all  exit routes. While  previous research on 
reinvestment also found that reinvestment was not related to well-defined performance levels
(McCarthy et al., 1993), it is interesting that it also reduced the odds of harvest sales and 
harvest  liquidations.  As  a  failure-avoidance  strategy,  reinvestment  thus  seems to  be less 
effective than cost reduction. Cost reductions have direct effects on firm performance while 
reinvestments  provide  a  temporary buffer  for  failing  firms.  As  suggested,  there  might  be 
disincentives to additional investments if tax laws punish entrepreneurs taking out money as 
salaries or dividends. If corroborated, this is an important finding for public policy makers.
7. Conclusions, limitations and future research
Exit does not equate with either success or failure (Gimeno et al., 1997). This paper
views entrepreneurial exit jointly as a career choice and liquidation of a financial investment, 
combining human capital theory and prospect theory to develop a theoretical framework of 
four  exit  routes  corresponding  to  different  levels  of  performance.  Our  study  finds  that 
entrepreneurs’  human  capital  and  failure-avoidance strategies  differed  across exit  routes, 
explaining why previous research has shown conflicting results. This indicate that scholars 
need to carefully differentiate between the performance of firms and the career choices of 
entrepreneurs since both are relevant for understanding the births and deaths of firms as well 
as entries and exits of entrepreneurs from those firms (Arum and Muller, 2004).
A limitation of this study is that we could not empirically distinguish between bankruptcy 
and liquidation. The choice between the two depends on legal frameworks (Thorburn, 2000) 
and culture, such as the stigma of failure. It is unlikely that these categories represent distinct 
differences in performance or that the choices between them are driven by human capital or 
failure-avoidance strategies. Nevertheless, being able to show this empirically would have 
been  valuable. Further,  restricting  our sample  to  entrepreneurs  in  knowledge-intensive 31
industries  has  the  advantage of reducing unobserved  heterogeneity but  also  limits 
generalizability. Replicating the analyses in other industries and countries would be highly 
valuable. While we found that education had some effects on exit, they were not fully in line 
with the hypotheses. A likely explanation is that while years of education approximate length
of experience it says little about the quality of experience. More fine-grained assessments of 
education and experience would be valuable. Another limitation was the lack of distinctive 
variables predicting harvest liquidation. As mentioned above, legal systems might affect the
boundaries between exit outcomes, indicating that cross-national research on exit is needed. A 
final limitation is that our human capital/career choice framework necessitated that we focus 
only on individual exit and had to exclude 14 team start-ups.
Viewing exit both as a career choice and a liquidation of a financial investment allows for 
interesting extensions to this framework. For example, our model’s focus on the skills, goals, 
and actions of individual founders could be extended to explain exit from entrepreneurial 
teams  and  exit  from  family  firms. Further,  experimental  studies  indicate  that  the  relative 
explanatory power of expected utility and prospect theory vary with demographics such as
gender, age, and education (Harrisson and Rutström, 2007). Such insights could be valuable 
to future applications of prospect theory to entrepreneur's exit decisions. A final interesting 
finding is that women entrepreneurs were less likely to exit by harvest sale. This complements 
prior findings  that  women  entrepreneurs  have  different  expectancies  of  performance
(Manolova et al., 2007). The role of gender on exit routes is an area worthy of further inquiry.
In sum, this study suggests that future research should be careful to disentangle exit of 
entrepreneurs from their firm vs. exit of the firm itself. Such work should consider both the 
type of exit as well as the human capital and behavioral aspects of the entrepreneur that lead 
to such exits. We hope that this study will encourage additional work in this area.
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Table 1: 
Variable means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Continuation 0.342 0.475
2 Harvest Liquidation 0.264 0.441 -0.432*
3 Distress Liquidation 0.255 0.430 -0.418*-0.347*
4 Harvest Sale 0.081 0.272 -0.214*-0.177*-0.172*
5 Distress Sale 0.062 0.241 -0.185*-0.153*-0.148*-0.076*
6 Entrepr. Experience 1.137 1.711 -0.024 -0.010 -0.026 0.093* 0.008
7 Entrepreneur’s Age  43.637 11.041 -0.042 -0.046 -0.017 0.107* 0.087* 0.019
8 Education 13.025 2.664 0.051* -0.016 0.025 -0.074* -0.021 -0.262* 0.047*
9 Industry Experience 1.734 1.746 0.120* -0.029 -0.040 -0.048*-0.054*-0.122* 0.039 0.072*
10 Taking outside job 0.115 0.319 0.095* 0.014 -0.092* -0.014 -0.055* 0.033 -0.020 0.009 0.037
11 Reinvestments 7.648 6.069 0.370* -0.204*-0.070*-0.047*-0.060*-0.074* -0.039 0.079* 0.128* 0.046
12 Gender (1=women) 0.278 0.448 0.021 -0.048* 0.058* -0.052* -0.010 0.082* -0.025 -0.083* -0.013 -0.018 0.014
13 Parents owned business0.168 0.374 0.044 -0.027 -0.007 -0.037 0.013 -0.031 -0.180* 0.016 0.004 0.037 0.021 0.021
14 Incorporated firm 0.806 0.402 0.232* 0.067* -0.275* 0.011* -0.017 -0.023 -0.020* 0.076* 0.086* 0.159* 0.180* -0.072* 0.016
15 County tenure 6.283 1.570 0.045 -0.057* 0.016 0.014 -0.019 -0.099* 0.152* 0.075* 0.064* -0.014 0.039 -0.011 0.005 0.014
16 Firm age 4.519 2.931 0.857 -0.374 -0.377*-0.143*-0.158* -0.027 -0.023 0.076* 0.137* 0.086* 0.391* -0.005 0.026 -0.262* 0.049*
17 Firm size 3.020 11.369 0.146 -0.045 -0.079* -0.022 -0.038 -0.003 -0.048* -0.002 0.027 0.008 0.051* -0.001 -0.003 -0.068* -0.008 0.145*
Industry and time dummies omitted. The four dependent variables, Outside job, Gender, and Incorporation dummies represent total frequencies. * p < 05.37
Table 2:
Multinomial Logit model on Entrepreneurs’ Exit Routes
Note: ª p<0.10; *p<05; **p<0.01; (two-tailed). N= 1,735 in all analyses. Coefficients in relation to the omitted 
category (continuation), with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Dummy variables for industry and 
year of exit not displayed.









Entrepreneurial Exp. 0.001 -0.025 0.149 ** -0.010
(0.043) (0.044) (0.058) (0.061)
H1: 3>0,1,2,4  **
Age -0.006 -0.009 0.023 ** 0.028 **
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
H2a:3>0,1,2   ** H2a: 4>0,1,2   **
Education -0.006 0.068 * -0.019 0.001
(0.028) (0.030) (0.036) (0.037)
H3: 3>0       N/S
Taking up outside job -0.212 -0.641 ** -0.278 -0.996 *
(0.196) (0.237) (0.346) (0.419)
H4a: 2>0,1,3   ** H4b: 4>0,1,3   **
Reinvestments -0.149 *** -0.093 *** -0.161 *** -0.123 ***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
H5: 1,2,3,4<0     ***
Industry Experience -0.059 -0.061 -0.094 * -0.196 *
(0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.080)
Gender (1=women) -0.214 0.174 -0.406 * -0.088
(0.157) (0.154) (0.202) (0.257)
Parents owned firm -0.313 -0.201 -0.352 0.204
(0.183) (0.185) (0.297) (0.295)
County tenure -0.087 * -0.026 -0.008 -0.108
(0.044) (0.045) (0.067) (0.072)
Incorporated firm -0.315 -1.594 *** -1.083 *** -0.442 **
(0.230) (0.209) (0.264) (0.312)
Firm size -0.063 -0.262 * 0.051 * -0.441 **
(0.044) (0.104) (0.022) (0.151)
Number of cases 458 436 154 91
Log-pseudo likelihood: -1615.6
BIC value (fit statistic) -9467.64
Correctly classified cases:   73.40%38
Figure 1: Taxonomy of Exit Routes
Figure 2: Prospect Theory and Entrepreneurial Exit Routes
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ANOVA tests of between-group differences in firms’ mean age (F-value: 2.55, p<0.05), firms’
mean financial health (F-value: 120.21, p<0.05), and proportion of firm using a failure-avoiding 
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